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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, ERIE COUNTY 
LOCAL 815, ERIE COUNTY UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
CASENO.U-28198 
- and -
COUNTY OF ERIE, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (TIMOTHY CONNICK of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
JAECKLE, FLEISCHMAN & MUGEL, LLP (SEAN P. BEITER AND ELISHA J. 
BURKART of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the County of Erie (County) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice charge, as 
amended, filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Erie County Local 815, Erie County Unit (CSEA) alleging that the County 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally implemented a policy of hiring employees to fill regular part-time (RPT) 
positions to replace employees who vacate full-time positions in the same title, without 
any change in the nature and level of services provided by the County. 
Following a one day hearing, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that the County 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by implementing the new policy of replacing full-time 
positions with RPT positions without modifying the nature or level of service provided.1 
1
 42 PERB H4517 (2009). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the County challenges various factual and legal conclusions 
reached by the ALJ in finding that it violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. The County's 
exceptions assert the following: 
a) CSEA failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a 
unilateral change in the terms and conditions of employment 
of unit members; 
b) The ALJ erred in crediting the terms of the County's RPT 
written policy over the description of the policy given during 
the testimony of Department of Personnel Commissioner 
John W. Greenan; 
c) The subject matter of the charge is nonmandatory; 
d) The ALJ erred in rejecting the County's duty satisfaction, 
waiver and mission-related defenses; 
) 
e) The ALJ erred in ordering a make whole remedy as part of 
the remedial order. 
CSEA supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we affirm the decision of the ALJ, as hereinafter modified. 
FACTS 
CSEA is the certified negotiating representative of the white collar unit of full-time 
and regular part-time County employees.2 The current collectively negotiated 
agreement (agreement) between the parties defines the unit as including employees 
holding full-time positions, or "regular part-time positions (20 working hours or more per 
week)", in the titles that are listed in Appendix A of the agreement,3 The agreement 
2
 County of Erie, 14 PERB 1J3000.15 (1981). 
3
 Joint Exhibit 2, Article II, §§3 and 4. 
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does not define the phrase "full-time position" by the number of hours worked but makes 
clear that the phrase covers permanent, temporary and/or provisional positions. The 
normal work week is defined in the agreement as not exceeding forty (40) hours.4 An 
employee who works less than 20 hours per week is considered a non-regular part-time 
employee and is not in the bargaining unit. 
The agreement contains certain negotiated terms and conditions for RPT 
employees. Pursuant to the agreement, the period of employment in an RPT position is 
treated as 50% of the period of actual service for purposes of calculating continuous 
service.5 The agreement also contains negotiated benefits for RPT positions.6 
The County's practice has been to treat employees in RPT positions, regardless 
of the number of hours worked in excess of 20 hours, as being entitled to 50% of the 
amount of negotiated vacation, sick, personal and bereavement leave under the 
agreement. In addition, as a matter of practice, employees in RPT positions receive 
one half-hour for a meal break, four hours of pay for holidays and fifteen minutes of 
4
 Joint Exhibit 2, Article XIII, §13.1. 
5
 Joint Exhibit 2, Article II, §16. 
6
 Article XXXVII, §37.1 states: 
Regular part-time employees who work twenty (20) or more 
hours per week shall be entitled to receive all benefits 
provided to all full-time employees covered by this 
agreement, but on a pro-rated basis. It is understood that 
such regular part-time employees will be entitled to full 
coverage of hospitalization and medical expenses. 
In reaching our decision, we do not consider whether providing 50% benefits to 
employees in RPT positions satisfies the County's pro-rata obligation set forth in §37.1 
of the agreement because that is a contractual issue beyond our jurisdiction pursuant to 
§205.5(d) of the Act. Appropriately, CSEA has not raised the contract issue before us. 
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"summer hour time" per day in July and August. 
Department of Personnel Commissioner John W. Greenan (Greenan) testified 
that each County position is specifically numbered. In order for an existing vacant full-
time position to be replaced by an RPT position, the full-time position must be 
eliminated and a new RPT position created. 
It is undisputed that the County has employed individuals in RPT positions for 
decades, but it has not had a practice of eliminating full-time positions and replacing 
them with RPT positions. Historically, the number of hours worked by RPT positions 
has fluctuated between 20 to 39 hours per week. The County has used RPT positions 
primarily in continuously operating facilities such as hospitals and youth detention 
facilities. It has also used RPT positions on a much more limited basis in the 
Department of Social Services (DSS) and in the Probation Department. 
In late January 2008, a newspaper published a story describing a County 
initiative to begin hiring employees in RPT positions to replace employees who vacated 
full-time positions. The newspaper story stemmed from a directive issued by the new 
County Executive to County commissioners.7 In response to the published story, CSEA 
asked its members to send it any information they receive about the County hiring 
employees in RPT positions to replace employees who worked in full-time positions. 
As a result of its request, CSEA obtained a copy of an internal County email from 
Department of Personnel employee Joseph Murphy (Murphy) to Greenan, dated 
February 5, 2008. The email responded to questions received from DSS about the 
7
 Unbeknownst to CSEA, the former County Executive had expressed a preference that 
the County hire employees in RPT positions, which was followed to a limited degree by 
County commissioners. 
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internal County procedures to be followed with respect to "the Conversion of Full Time 
positions to RPT", including procedures for the canvassing of candidates to fill 
positions.8 Murphy's email states that a position previously canvassed as a full-time 
position did not have to be recanvassed as an RPT position because civil service 
considers 39 hours to be full-time. In addition, the email states that a full-time position 
can be converted to an RPT position while an employee holding the position is on leave. 
After receiving Murphy's email, Greenan forwarded it to DSS Commissioner 
Michael Weiner (Weiner) and DSS Personnel Assistant Joseph Dobies, who then 
distributed it within DSS.9 In February 2008, a document was distributed during a DSS 
supervisor meeting stating that all new entry level positions would be filled as RPT 
positions and they will "work 39 hours a week (no less per personnel)."10 
In February 2008, CSEA also obtained two internal County documents entitled 
RPT Hiring Process and Benefits for Regular Part-time Employees of Erie County.11 
According to Greenan, the documents were drafts that had been prepared by 
Department of Personnel employees Murphy and Susan Agos. The draft RPT Hiring 
Process document refers to the new County Executive's January 2008 directive and 
states that all "new employees that are being hired from outside County Government for 
employment will be hired as an RPT." 
On March 24, 2008, Greenan issued a memorandum to County department 
8
 Charging Party Exhibit 1. 
9
 Charging Party Exhibit 1, Transcript pp. 70-71. 
10
 Charging Party Exhibit 3. 
11
 Charging Party Exhibit 2. 
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heads stating that, consistent with the new County Executive's directive, all new 
employees will henceforth be hired as RPT employees "working 39 hours a week."12 
The memorandum states the new policy is inapplicable to current County employees 
and to employees who transfer to County employment from positions with the Erie 
County Medical Center Corporation, Erie County Home, Buffalo & Erie County Public 
Libraries and Erie Community College.13 The memorandum directs that all available 
County positions be canvassed as "full-time/RPT (39 hours per week)." 
Attached to the memorandum are three additional documents including the 
finalized RPT Hiring Process and Benefits for Regular Part-time Employees of Erie 
County. Consistent with the County Executive's directive and Greenan's memorandum, 
the RPT Hiring Process states: 
New employees being hired from outside County 
Government will be hired as Regular Part Time. 
CSEA witnesses testified that following the County Executive's January directive, the 
County began to replace employees who vacated full-time positions with new employees in 
39-hour RPT positions. Scott R. Smith (Smith) testified that in the Probation Department 
the County has hired four new RPT probation officers to work 39 hours to replace full-time 
probation officers without any change in the level of services. He identified James 
Robinson, Jacqueline Loga and Jill Monacilli as newly hired 39-hour RPT probation officers 
who replaced full-time probation officers. Each of those new hires was assigned a full 
12
 Joint Exhibit 1. 
13
 Joint Exhibit 1. Under the policy, departments headed by other elected officials are 
not bound by the policy: County Clerk, Sheriff, County Comptroller, and the District 
Attorney. 
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probation officer case load.14 Joan Bender (Bender) testified that in DSS, the County has 
expanded the use of RPT positions by replacing full-time account clerk employees with new 
employees in RPT positions. 
During his testimony, Greenan denied that the County Executive issued a 
directive to hire new employees in RPT positions, and denied that under the County's 
policy new employees in RPT positions must work 39 hours per week. According to 
Greenan, departments retain the discretion to hire RPT employees to work between 20 
to 39 hours per week. However, he admitted that under the County's RPT policy, full-
time positions are being abolished and replaced with RPT positions resulting in cost-
savings for the County.15 During the hearing, the County did not present any evidence 
of a change in level of services provided or a change in its mission. 
DISCUSSION 
In its exceptions, the County asserts that CSEA failed to demonstrate a change 
in County policy and practice by replacing full-time positions with 39-hour RPT 
positions. The crux of the County's argument is that the ALJ was incorrect in finding 
that the testimony of CSEA witnesses, supported by the documentary evidence, is more 
credible than the testimony of Greenan. 
Both Greenan's memorandum, and the emails that preceded it, demonstrate a 
clear and explicit County policy change to begin converting full-time positions into 39-hour 
RPT positions. The conversion is to take place only upon the hiring of new employees, 
and the Department of Personnel advised the other County departments to begin hiring 
14
 Smith also testified that the County has hired six employees from other County 
departments as full-time probation officers. 
15
 Transcript, pp. 100, 104-105. 
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"Regular Part Time (RPT) working 39 hours a week" and to "canvass all available 
positions as full-time/RPT (39 hours per week)." In addition, the email sent to the DSS 
Commissioner by Greenan expressly advised that County civil service treats employees 
who work 39 hours a week as full-time employees. The County's documents do not 
require departments to make determinations with respect to staffing and workload needs. 
Despite the explicit directive given to County commissioners, Greenan testified 
that the policy did not mandate the replacement of full-time positions with RPT positions 
working 39 hours per week, and that each department is at liberty to determine whether 
to utilize an RPT position based upon operational need. In light of the clear and 
unambiguous nature of the County's internal documents, the ALJ was correct in 
concluding that Greenan's description of the RPT policy is not credible. 
We find the County's challenge to the CSEA evidence about the changed practices 
in the Probation Department and DSS to be equally without merit. Without objection from 
the County, Smith specifically identified three 39-hour RPT probation officers who were 
hired to replace full-time probation officers, following the County Executive's directive, 
without any change in the assigned caseload and responsibilities. Similarly, CSEA 
presented testimonial and documentary evidence demonstrating an expansion in the hiring 
of 39-hour RPT positions in DSS to replace full-time positions without a modification in the 
services provided. While certain aspects of the testimony presented by CSEA witnesses 
constitute hearsay, hearsay is admissible in an administrative hearing and it can form the 
sole basis for an administrative determination.16 The specificity of Smith's testimony about 
16
 Gray vAdduci, 73 NY2d 741 (1988). In addition, the County's internal documents, in 
the record contain admissions against interest, which is an exception to the hearsay 
rule. Village of New Paltz, 25 PERB 1J3032 (1992). 
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the Probation Department, along with documentation about the DSS hiring of employees to 
fill RPT positions in April and May 2008, contradicts the County's assertion that the 
evidence is conclusory. 
Furthermore, we note that during his testimony Greenan did not refute the 
description provided by CSEA witnesses of the hiring practices in the Probation 
Department and DSS since the County Executive's directive.17 In addition, as the ALJ 
found, the County did not present any evidence with respect to the number of hours 
worked by the newly hired employees in the RPT positions following the County 
Executive's directive. 
We also reject the County's argument that, by "using one RPT employee to 
replace one full-time employee, there is logically a change in both the hours and level of 
services."18 While there certainly has been a change in the number of hours worked, 
the County has not presented any evidence demonstrating that it assigned less work to 
employees in RPT positions than it did to employees in full-time positions or that it has 
decreased the level of services. In fact, the record does not include any evidence that 
prior to replacing a full-time position the County determined that the work of the position 
could be performed in less than 40 hours. Instead, the evidence reveals that the 
County is substituting 39-hour RPT employees to handle the same case load as full-
time employees for the sole purpose of cost savings. 
The ALJ's decision held that the County's unilateral action of replacing full-time 
positions with RPT positions violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act because the County failed 
17
 State of New York (Division of Parole), 41 PERB Tf3033.-n.15 (2008). 
18
 Brief of Respondent County of Erie in Support of Exceptions, p. 25. 
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to demonstrate any change in the nature or level of services provided. Although we 
agree with the ALJ's legal conclusion, we find that she erred in her reliance on our 
precedent holding that an employer cannot unilaterally abolish a full-time position and 
substitute it with two half-time positions when there is no change in the level of 
services.19 The facts of those cases are inapposite to the present case because the 
County is not unilaterally splitting full-time positions into two part-time positions and 
maintaining the same total number of hours worked. Rather, it is replacing full-time 
positions with 39-hour RPT positions without a diminution in workload or the level of 
services provided. Nevertheless, the legal principle underlying those decisions is fully 
applicable to the present case: although staffing and the level of services provided by 
an employer are nonmandatory subjects under the Act, an employer's choice of the 
specific means of accomplishing those prerogatives directly affect terms and conditions 
of employment and, therefore, is a mandatory subject.20 
In Lackawanna Central School District2^ we held that it is a managerial prerogative 
for an employer to reduce the hours of a position so long as the employer has determined 
that the work can be performed in a shorter period of time. Similarly, in Vestal Central 
School District,22 we concluded that an employer can unilaterally decrease the number of 
19
 State of New York-Unified Court System, 28 PERB P014 (1995) (the unilateral 
conversion of a full-time position into two part-time positions to work alternative full-time 
work weeks constitutes a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act); County of Broome, 22 
PERB 1J3019 (1989) (the unilateral conversion of three full-time positions into six half-
time positions at the same level or nature of services violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act). 
20
 Starpoint Cent Sch Dist, 23 PERB P012 (1990). 
21
 12 PERB 1J3122 (1979). See also, City of Lackawanna, 13 PERB 1J3085 (1980). 
22
 15 PERB P006 (1982), confirmed sub nom. Vestal Teachers Assn v Newman, 95 
AD2d 940, 16 PERB ^7020 (1983). 
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work hours and pay of unit employees if there is a demonstrated diminution in the amount 
of work needed to be performed. When there is such a good faith reduction in services, it 
can "justify the public employer in [unilaterally] reducing its employees' workload with a 
commensurate reduction in salaries. Whether or not such a purpose is present is in the 
nature of an affirmative defense necessarily to be made by the employer."23 When the 
record is "barren of any proof that the subject change was made to curtail or limit services 
to the public" we will find an employer to have violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act by 
unilaterally decreasing the work hours and pay of its employees.24 
In the present case, the County is reducing the number of hours and benefits of 
unit employees by converting full-time positions to 39-hour RPT positions without it 
presenting any evidence of a specific determination that the same level of services can 
be completed in fewer hours or evidence that the County made a good faith reduction in 
services.J In light of the documentary and testimonial evidence in the record, we are not 
persuaded by the County's summary argument that any decrease in the number of 
hours constitutes a perse decrease in services. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the subject matter 
of the charge is mandatory and turn our attention to the County's duty satisfaction, 
waiver and mission defenses. 
To demonstrate a duty satisfaction defense, a party must present evidence 
demonstrating that the parties have negotiated an agreement with terms that are reasonably 
" Schuylerville Cent Sch Dist, 14 PERB P035 at 3058 (1981). 
24
 Oswego City Sch Dist, 5 PERB 1J3011 at 3024 (1972), confirmed, 42 AD2d 262, 6 
PERB U7008 (3d Dept 1973). 
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clear on the subject presented for decision.25 In the present case, the County contends that 
the ALJ erred in rejecting its duty satisfaction defense. In support of its defense the County 
relies upon its past practice of employing individuals in RPT positions, the negotiated benefits 
for RPT employees in the agreement, and the management rights clause. 
By definition, a duty satisfaction defense is based upon the terms of an agreement. 
The County's practice of hiring employees in RPT positions is irrelevant to such a defense 
because the contract is silent with respect to the subject of the charge: replacing 
employees in full-time positions with employees in RPT positions.26 Contrary to the 
County's contention, Article XXXVII, §37.1 of the agreement does not set forth any terms 
relevant to the subject matter of the charge. Rather, that contractual provision sets forth 
the negotiated benefits for RPT positions, and is silent with respect to the County's right 
to eliminate full-time positions and replace them with newly created RPT positions. 
Finally, the management rights reserved in Article III, §3.1 are insufficient to form 
the basis for the County's duty satisfaction or waiver defenses. The management rights 
clause states: 
Except as expressly limited by other provisions of this 
Agreement, all of the authority, rights and responsibilities 
processed by the County are retained by it, including, but not 
limited to, the right to determine the mission, purpose, 
objectives and policies of the County; to determine facilities 
methods, means and number of personnel for the conduct of 
the County programs; to administer the merit system, 
including the examination, selection, recruitment, hiring, 
appraisal, training, retention, promotion, assignment or 
transfer of employees pursuant to law; to direct, deploy and 
*> Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc, 42 PERB 1J3023 (2009); NYCTA, 41 
PERBfl3014(2008). 
26
 Furthermore, there is no evidence of a past practice of the County substituting RPT 
positions for full-time positions or that CSEA acquiesced to such a practice. 
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utilize the work force; to establish specifications for each 
class of positions, and to classify or re-classify, and to 
allocate or re-allocate new or existing positions in 
accordance with law and the provisions of this Agreement. 
In State of New York-Unified Court System,27 we construed an almost identical 
management rights clause granting the employer the power to determine "methods, 
means and number of personnel required" to constitute only a reservation of existing 
rights that does not "include the right to unilaterally 'substitute part-time employees for 
full-time employees'."28 Similarly, in the present case, Article III, §3.1 does not include a 
specific grant of additional authority to the County to replace full-time employees with 
RPT employees. Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's decision rejecting the County's duty 
satisfaction and waiver defenses and turn to the County's mission-related defense. 
It is well-settled that an employer's policy decision may not be mandatorily negotiable 
if it is inherently or fundamentally related to the primary mission of the employer.29 However, 
the mere fact that a work rule has some relationship to an employer's mission does not grant 
an employer the authority to act unilaterally if the change significantly or unnecessarily 
intrudes on the protected interests of bargaining unit members under the Act.30 
In its exceptions, the County asserts that the ALJ erred by rejecting its mission-
related defense on the grounds that the County did not pursue the issue. In New York City 
z
' Supra note 19. 
28
 Supra note 19, 28 PERB at 3039. 
29
 County of Erie v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 12 NY3d 72, 42 PERB 1J7002 
(2009). 
30
 City of Albany, 42 PERB P005 (2009). 
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Transit Authority,3'1 the Board held that the failure of a charging party to brief a pled claim 
does not constitute the abandonment of that claim. The same principle is applicable when 
a respondent fails to brief issues regarding a pled defense. Therefore, we modify the 
ALJ's decision to the extent that, she concluded that the County did not pursue its defense 
because the issue was not briefed. 
However, we affirm the ALJ's rejection of the County's mission-related defense 
because it is unsupported by the evidence. The County's defense rests on Greenan's 
memorandum and testimony, which it contends demonstrate that the new RPT policy 
requires a department-based operational determination as to whether a vacancy should 
be filled by a full-time or RPT employee. In fact, Greenan's March 24, 2008 
memorandum reinforced the County Executive's directive that henceforth all employees 
hired from outside County government to replace full-time employees will be hired as 
39-hour RPTs. The evidence presented by the County does not demonstrate a change 
in its mission or that such change outweighs the interest of the CSEA bargaining unit. 
Finally, we reject the County's exception challenging the ALJ's proposed 
remedial order. Pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act, the Board has the authority to direct a 
party to cease and desist from engaging in an improper practice, to take such 
affirmative action that will effectuate the policies of the Act, and to issue a make-whole 
remedy for the loss of wages and benefits, with interest at the maximum rate permitted 
by law, to any employees harmed as the result of the improper practice. Any factual 
disputes regarding the proper application of the remedial order to particular employees 
can be addressed during a compliance proceeding following judicial enforcement, 
41 PERB Tj3014(2008). 
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pursuant to §213(a) of the Act.32 
Based on the foregoing, we find that the County violated §209- a. 1(d) of the Act 
when it unilaterally implemented the practice in 2008 of hiring employees in RPT 
positions to replace employees in full-time positions in the absence of any demonstrated 
change in the nature or level of service. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the County: 
1. stop replacing full-time positions with regular part-time positions to perform 
the same level of services; 
2. negotiate with CSEA regarding the replacement of full-time positions with 
regular part-time positions performing the same level of services; 
3. make whole for loss of wages and benefits, if any, with interest at the 
maximum legal rate, any employee hired in a regular part-time position to 
replace an employee in a full-time position pursuant to the County's 2008 
regular part-time policy; and 
4. sign and post the attached Notice at all locations normally used to post 
communication to unit employees. 
DATED: April 22, 2010 
Albany, New York 
AA*dr J )&Jr 
^—Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sk&i-s 
Sheila sTCole, Member 
Manhasset Union Free School District, 42 PERB P016 (2009). 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Erie represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000 AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Erie County 
Local 815, Erie County Unit that the County of Erie will: 
1. not replace full-time positions with regular part-time positions to 
perform the same level of services; 
2. negotiate with CSEA regarding the replacement of full-time 
positions with regular part-time positions performing the same 
level of services; and 
3. make whole for loss of wages and benefits, if any, with interest at 
the maximum legal rate, any employees hired as regular part-time 
pursuant to the County's 2008 regular part-time policy. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
County of Erie 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHRISTINE V. SERAFIN, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28299 
- and -
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 650, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
- and -
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Employer. 
CHRISTINE V. SERAFIN, pro se 
REDEN & O'DONNELL, LLP (ROBERT J. REDEN of counsel), 
for Respondent 
DAVID RODRIGUEZ, ACTING CORPORATION COUNSEL 
(LEONARDO D. SETTE-CAMARA of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Christine V. Serafin 
(Serafin) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper 
practice charge alleging that American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 650 (Local 650) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it did not process an overtime grievance 
Case No. U-28299 - 2 -
on her behalf against her employer, the City of Buffalo (City).1 
The ALJ issued a decision on October 20, 2009, dismissing the charge based on 
a stipulated record consisting of the pleadings, Serafin's offer of proof, Local 650's 
response, and a purported stipulation of facts. He concluded that Serafin failed to prove 
that Local 650 had breached its duty of fair representation, in violation of §209-a.2(c) of 
the Act, by engaging in arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct when it refused to 
process Serafin's grievance following a merits review of the grievance by Local 650 
President Michael Drennen (Drennen). 
EXCEPTIONS 
In her exceptions, Serafin challenges the stipulation of facts. In addition, she 
contends that the ALJ erred in finding that Local 650's refusal to process her grievance 
was not arbitrary, discriminatory or founded in bad faith. Local 650 and the City support 
the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record, consideration of the parties' arguments and 
application of relevant precedent, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On April 17, 2008, Serafin filed a charge alleging that Local 650 violated §209-
a.2(c) of the Act when Local 650 President Drennen refused to process her grievance 
against the City's Department of Public Works, Parks and Streets (DPW). 
In her charge, as later clarified by her offer of proof, Serafin alleged that Local 
650 was protecting DPW's discriminatory distribution of overtime to certain favored 
DPW employees by refusing to file a grievance challenging the alleged mismanagement 
1
 42 PERB 1J4575 (2009). 
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of the payroll overtime wheel. Additionally, Serafin alleged that Local 650 failed to 
provide an explanation of its reasons for the refusal, which demonstrates the arbitrary 
nature of its actions. 
Specifically, Serafin alleged that on April 14, 2008, she approached Local 650 
Vice President and Grievance Committee Chairman Michael Hoffert (Hoffert) to request 
the filing of an overtime grievance concerning the application of the overtime wheel in 
DPW. According to Serafin's charge, Hoffert told her that the proposed grievance was 
valid but stated that he could not process it, and referred her to Drennen. However, 
when she approached Drennen with her request, he refused to file the grievance. 
According to Serafin, from 2006-2008, DPW offered overtime opportunities to 
certain employees to the detriment of other employees in violation of the collectively 
negotiated agreement (agreement) between the City and Local 650.2 She asserted that 
when the overtime wheel was established in DPW, ho specific jobs or duties were 
singled out as being specially assigned to certain employees on the wheel. 
Serafin attached to her charge a letter she sent to Drennen dated April 14, 2008, 
in which she reiterated her request to file a grievance. In her letter, she stated that a 
2
 Section 3.2(1) of the agreement states: 
Overtime work shall be offered equally to all 
employees working within the same job classification 
or department. The opportunity to work overtime shall 
be offered to the employees within the job 
classifications of the department involved on a 
rotational basis. 
prior similar grievance had been processed by Local 650 and was denied at step two.3 
In addition, she requested an explanation as to why Local 650 refused to represent her 
and why payroll was treated as a "special item" for overtime purposes. 
Two days later, Serafin sent another letter to Drennen demanding restitution from 
the City for overtime that she would have worked if the overtime wheel had been used. 
It is undisputed that Drennen did not reply to either letter. 
The City did not file an answer, but submitted a position statement on May 9, 
2008, in which it offered its interpretation of the agreement in support of its argument 
against Serafin's claim. According to the City, the overtime wheel utilized by DPW is 
comprised of all employees working in the same job classification in each district, 
precinct or station, and overtime opportunities are offered equally only to the employees 
within the same job classification. It is the City's position that payroll duties are not 
included in the job classification of Serafin's Senior Inventory Clerk position, and as a-
result, Serafin was not eligible to be included in the payroll overtime wheel. 
On May 13, 2008, Local 650 filed its answer, raising as an affirmative defense 
that Local 650 filed a grievance on Serafin's behalf on December 15, 2006, which 
alleged that DPW was mismanaging the overtime wheel. According to Local 650, it 
processed and investigated the 2006 grievance, and determined that it lacked merit. 
Based upon this determination, it did not process the grievance to arbitration. 
On June 17, 2008, a conference was held with respect to the charge. The 
following day, the ALJ sent a letter to the parties directing Serafin to submit an offer of 
3
 In her charge and offer, Serafin does not identify the date or year that she filed this 
grievance. According to Local 650, however, the grievance was filed on December 15, 
2006. For purposes of this decision, and without rendering a factual determination as to 
when she filed the grievance, we will refer to it as the 2006 grievance. 
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proof in support of her charge, and for Local 650 to file a response to that offer. 
In her offer, Serafin alleged that when she approached Drennen on April 14, 
2008, Drennen acted in an annoyed manner, and he refused to process the grievance 
without discussing the basis of the grievance or investigating its merits. Serafin also 
stated in her offer that Local 650 processed a successful overtime grievance on her 
behalf several years ago concerning the denial of overtime.4 
In addition, Serafin asserted that a class action grievance was filed by several 
DPW employees alleging mismanagement of the overtime wheel. According to Serafin, 
in response to the class action grievance, Local 650 explained that the employees who 
worked the overtime were payroll employees, that they were "special," and that overtime 
was not to be given to anyone else. However, the record is unclear regarding the 
disposition of that grievance. 
In its response to Serafin's offer, Local 650 asserted that it did not process 
Serafin's 2008 grievance because the grievance lacked merit. While it admitted that 
Serafin spoke with Hoffert about filing the 2008 grievance, it denied Serafin's claim that 
Hoffert stated that it was valid. In addition, Local 650 claimed that Serafin's allegations, 
as clarified by her offer of proof, were insufficient because she did not identify a single 
overtime opportunity that she was denied under the agreement. Pursuant to §19.1 of 
the agreement, all grievances must be submitted at step one within "twenty (20) working 
days of the occurrence of the facts giving rise to the grievance or notice of such facts to 
the employee, whichever is later." Attached to its response, Local 650 appended a 
4
 Serafin does not identify the date or year that she filed this grievance. According to 
Local 650, however, it was filed in 2000. For purposes of this decision, and without 
rendering a factual determination as to when she filed the grievance, we will refer to it 
as the 2000 grievance. 
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copy of Serafin's payroll summary, for the period December 31, 2007-May 4, 2008. The 
summary shows that Serafin worked and was paid for overtime on three weekends prior 
to her request that Local 650 file the overtime grievance. Local 650 pointed out that 
Serafin did not set forth any facts in her offer of proof that would demonstrate that 
overtime was available on the one weekend she did not work in the twenty day period 
prior to requesting Local 650 to process her grievance. 
According to Local 650, its decision not to process Serafin's grievance in 2008 
was based upon its handling of her similar 2006 grievance, which alleged the 
discriminatory distribution of overtime to perform payroll duties. That grievance was 
withdrawn by Local 650 after it was processed to step two because Local 650 
determined that payroll duties were not within her job classification. Consistent with the 
agreement, overtime opportunities to perform payroll duties had been offered to DPW 
employees whose job classifications included those duties. 
In support of its contract analysis, Local 650 referred to §3.2(1) of the agreement 
and the parties' mutual interpretation of those terms in support of its conclusion that 
Serafin's 2006 and 2008 grievances lacked merit. Under that interpretation, overtime 
must be offered equally to employees in the same job classification within a department. 
Local 650 also stated in its response that at the time that the 2006 grievance was 
withdrawn, Hoffert informed Serafin of the reason for the withdrawal. Thus, when 
Serafin sought to file her grievance in 2008, she was aware of Local 650's position that 
an overtime grievance with respect to payroll duties would not be processed for any 
employee whose job classification did not include such duties. 
Finally, in response to Serafin's allegation that she filed and won an overtime 
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grievance, Local 650 submitted, with its response, a copy of Serafin's 2000 grievance, 
the City's denial, and the settlement agreement establishing that the City denied the 
grievance on the grounds that the duties were not within her job classification and that 
the overtime wheel was suspended on that particular date due to an emergency. 
Ultimately, Local 650 and the City settled the grievance. As a result of that settlement, 
Serafin was granted four hours of overtime. According to Local 650, the 2000 overtime 
grievance did not involve payroll duties. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin our discussion with Serafin's challenge to the stipulation of facts relied 
upon by the ALJ. 
1. Stipulation of Facts 
Following the submission of the offer of proof and response, the ALJ sent to the 
parties a proposed stipulation of facts aimed at assisting the parties in reaching 
agreement with respect to undisputed facts. The proposed stipulation contained eleven 
paragraphs, and was drafted by the ALJ based upon the allegations contained in the 
pleadings as clarified by the offer and responses. 
In response to the proposed stipulation, Local 650 submitted a letter dated 
February 26, 2009, stating that it had no suggested changes but reserving the right to 
make revisions depending on any proposed revisions by Serafin. The following day, 
however, Local 650 submitted a proposed revision of the third paragraph. In its two 
letters, Local 650 did not affirmatively agree to any of the other ten proposed stipulated 
facts. 
Serafin did not respond to Local 650's suggested changes-to the third paragraph, 
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which included additional allegations with respect to Serafin's interaction with Drennen. 
On March 6, 2009, Serafin submitted a letter to the ALJ proposing that the sixth 
paragraph be revised to state that as a Senior Inventory Clerk, she performed payroll 
duties in addition to her inventory duties. Local 650 objected to this proposed change in 
a letter dated March 9, 2009. 
By letter dated March 11, 2009, the ALJ submitted to the parties a redraft of the 
third paragraph and requested that the City clarify Serafin's title.5 In response to the 
ALJ's request, the City confirmed that Serafin's title was a Senior Inventory Clerk. 
Local 650 submitted another revised version of the third paragraph on March 18, 
2009. Two days later, the ALJ asked Serafin to submit a response to the suggested 
changes to the third paragraph. Serafin never responded. 
Before the close of the record, neither party expressly or implicitly agreed to the 
ALJ's proposed stipulation of facts, in whole or in part. 
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that the parties did not 
agree to the proposed stipulation of facts. Despite the ALJ's best efforts, the record 
does not evidence a meeting of the minds between Serafin and Local 650 over the 
proposed stipulation. There is no signed stipulation or confirming letters from the 
parties or the ALJ that demonstrate the necessary consent between the parties to the 
terms of the draft stipulation in whole or in part. In the absence of an agreement by the 
parties to the terms of the proposed stipulation, we find that the ALJ erred in dismissing 
the charge based, in part, on the proposed stipulation. 
5
 The City had been copied on most of the earlier correspondence with respect to the 
proposed stipulation. 
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2. Serafin's Allegations in the Charge, as Clarified by the Offer of Proof 
Based upon our conclusion that the parties did not agree to the stipulation, we 
examine the ALJ's dismissal in light of the allegations contained in the charge, as 
clarified by Serafin's offer of proof, granting all reasonable inferences to those 
allegations.6 
It is well-established that the Board will affirm the dismissal of a charge alleging a 
violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act on the pleadings if those allegations are insufficient, if 
proven, to demonstrate that the employee organization engaged in conduct that is 
discriminatory, arbitrary or founded in bad faith.7 An employee organization is entitled 
to a wide range of discretion and reasonableness regarding the processing of 
grievances.8 It is not a per se violation of the duty of fair representation for an 
employee organization to take a position which benefits some unit members to the 
detriment of others, absent a showing of discrimination or improper motivation.9 
In Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
6
 See, Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc., 42 PERB fl3023 (2009); Bd ofEduc 
of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York (Grassel), 43 PERB P010 (2010). 
7
 CSEA v. PERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 (3d Dept 1987), affd on 
other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 (1988); UFT (Ayazi), 32 PERB P069 
(1999). 
8
 New York City Transit Auth (Nwasokwa), 22 PERB 1J3028 (1989); District Council 37, 
AFSCME (Gonzalez), 28 PERB 1J3062 (1995); PEF (Frisch), 29 PERB P019 (1996); 
Rochester Teachers Assn (Danna), 41 PERB P003 (2008); District Council 37, 
AFSCME (Maltev), 41 PERB 1J3022 (2008). 
9
 South Huntington United Aides (Deerfield), 17 PERB 1J3012 (1984);UFT (Kauder), 18 
PERB P048 (1985); AFSCME (LaBarbara), 25 PERB 1J3070 (1992); Westchester 
County Dept of Corr Superior Officers'Assn, 26 PERB P077 (1993). 
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(Grassel)10, we determined that if a unit member specifically requests an explanation 
from an employee organization for its refusal to process a grievance, the employee 
organization's failure to provide such information constitutes a breach of the duty of fair 
representation. However, we will affirm the dismissal of a duty of fair representation 
charge when, following a review of a grievance, an employee organization makes a 
merits determination to not process a grievance, and provides an explanation for its 
decision in response to a unit member's request. 
In the present case, Serafin alleged that Local 650 protected DPW's distribution 
of overtime to certain favored employees to the detriment of other employees. She also 
alleged that Local 650 Vice President and Grievance Chairman Hoffert told her that the 
grievance had merit, yet when she approached Drennen with the grievance, Drennen 
acted annoyed and summarily rejected it without any apparent consideration of its 
merits. In addition, Serafin asserted that he refused to respond to her repeated 
requests for a written explanation of his reasons for not processing the grievance. 
The alleged disparity between Hoffert and Drennen in their respective reactions 
to the grievance, combined with Drennen's annoyance, summary refusal to process the 
grievance, and his failure to respond to Serafin's request for an explanation for not 
processing the grievance is sufficient to warrant a hearing on Serafin's charge.11 
Granting all reasonable inferences to Serafin's allegations, as we must, we conclude 
that they are sufficient to create an inference that Local 650 engaged in arbitrary, 
10
 23 PERB1J3042, at 3084 (1990). 
11
 UFT (McLaughlin), 24 PERB 1J3002 (1991); Bd ofEduc of City Sch Dist of the City of 
New York (Grassel), supra note 10. 
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discriminatory, or bad faith conduct with respect to its treatment of Serafin's grievance.12 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the decision of the ALJ and remand the 
case for further processing of the charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that this case is hereby remanded to the ALJ. 
DATED: April 22, 2010 
Albany, New York 
AMT?H< 
Jerome LefKowitz, Qnairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
S Sheila S. Cole\ Member 
12
 County of Nassau (Police Dept) (Unterweiser), 17 PERB 1J3013 (1984); UFT (Saidin), 
38 PERB H3025 (2005). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Chenango Forks Central 
School District (District) to a decision of the Assistant Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Assistant Director), on an improper practice charge filed 
by the Chenango Forks Teachers Association, NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO, Local 2561 
(Association), concluding that the District violated §209-a. 1(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally announced to current unit employees that 
it was discontinuing the past practice of reimbursing for the cost of Medicare Part B 
health insurance premiums (premiums) for current and retired employees age 65 or 
older, and their spouses.1 
142 PERB 1T4527 (2009). 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This is the second time this matter has come before the Board. In a prior 
decision we reversed, in part, an earlier decision by the Assistant Director2 that was 
based upon a stipulated record, and we remanded the case for the purpose of 
supplementing the record with respect to the limited issue of whether the Association 
and/or current employees had actual or constructive knowledge of the District's practice 
of reimbursing the cost of the premiums.3 Our remand was necessitated by an 
ambiguity in the stipulated record as it related to the particular nature of the alleged past 
practice in the present case. Although the stipulated record clearly demonstrates that 
the District reimbursed retirees for the premiums, we found that the wording of the 
stipulation failed to set forth sufficient facts demonstrating that the Association or current 
unit employees had had knowledge of the at-issue benefit so as to establish a 
reasonable expectation that the practice would continue. 
In our prior decision, we concluded that the record did establish that the District 
had knowledge of the practice of premium reimbursement. Our conclusion was based 
upon the District reimbursing the cost of the premiums without any restriction or 
qualification for a period of 15 years at a total cost of approximately $500,000.4 We also 
denied the District's exception that relied upon a statement in an arbitral opinion and 
2
 39 PERB 1J4602 (2006). 
3
 Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, 40 PERB ^3012 (2007). 
4
 The finding with respect to the District's knowledge was also supported by the content 
of the District's June 12, 2003 memorandum citing the cost of the practice as the 
rationale for ending it, as well as the annual budgetary process mandated by Education 
Law §2022 that includes a review of expenditures in budget preparation. 
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award regarding the lack of a past practice concerning the benefit.5 We found the 
arbitrator's statement to be mere dicta, and to the extent that the arbitrator had 
attempted to apply our past practice criteria, we deemed his conclusion to be repugnant 
to the Act. 
Our decision also expressly rejected the District's arguments that the subject 
matter of the charge, a monetary benefit related to health insurance for current 
employees, is not a term and condition of employment or a mandatory subject of 
negotiations. We concluded that the subject of the Association's charge is mandatory 
because it is a health insurance benefit that accrues while employed and is paid after an 
employee retires.6 Finally, we rejected the District's remaining exceptions including its 
assertion that the Association did not have a contractual right to the continuation of the 
premium reimbursements, its claim that the charge is moot based upon the parties' 
2004-2007 agreement, and its assertion that the continued reimbursement of premiums 
constitutes an unconstitutional gift of public funds. 
On remand, the Assistant Director conducted a hearing during which the 
Association called 14 witnesses who testified about their knowledge of the District's 
premium reimbursement practice. Following the hearing, the Assistant Director issued 
5
 The arbitrator denied the Association's grievance on the grounds that the District did 
not have a contractual obligation to continue reimbursing the premiums because the 
agreement did not include an explicit provision requiring such payments or a 
maintenance of benefits provision. Joint Exhibit 1, Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit S, p. 10. 
6
 Under the Act, there is no duty to negotiate for retirees, who, by definition, are not 
bargaining unit members. However, retiree health benefits for current employees who 
retire during the life of an agreement is a mandatory subject. See, Chenango Forks 
Cent Sch Dist, supra note 3. 
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a decision concluding that the Association and unit employees had actual knowledge of 
the District's practice at the time of the District's 2003 announcement, and therefore, 
she reaffirmed her prior determination that the District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act 
when it announced the discontinuance of its practice. In reaching her decision, the 
Assistant Director found the testimony of two of the Association's witnesses to be 
irrelevant. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The District excepts to the Assistant Director's decision on the grounds that the 
Assistant Director erred in crediting the testimony of the Association's witnesses, and in 
concluding that the Association and unit employees had knowledge of the practice prior 
to the District's announced discontinuance of the practice. 
In addition, the District repeats exceptions that we denied in our prior decision 
including its contentions that: a) the arbitrator's statement about the lack of a past 
practice is binding; b) the subject matter of the charge is not a term and condition of 
employment and a mandatory subject of negotiations under the Act; c) the charge is 
now moot as the result of the parties' 2004-2007 agreement; and (d) the continued 
practice of making reimbursement payments is an unconstitutional gift of public funds. 
The Association supports the Assistant Director's decision, and it asserts that 
certain District's exceptions are barred by the law of the case doctrine. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the respective 
arguments of the parties, we affirm the Assistant Director's decision. 
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FACTS 
Since at least 1980, the District reimbursed the premiums for unit members or 
retirees 65 years of age or older. While it is undisputed that retirees have actually 
received the benefit over the years, the parties state in their stipulation that they are 
unaware of whether current unit employees have ever received Medicare Part B 
benefits.7 During the hearing, no evidence was presented demonstrating that a 
premium reimbursement payment was made to a current unit employee. 
Until 1988, premium reimbursements were mandated by the District's former 
insurance provider. Following a change in insurance providers, the new provider did not 
obligate the District to continue making the premium reimbursement payments to 
retirees. However, the District continued to make the premium reimbursement 
payments to retirees until 2003, a period of 15 years. On June 12, 2003, the District's 
Business Administrator, Kathy Blackman (Blackman), sent a memorandum to all current 
employees announcing that, effective July 1, 2003, the District was discontinuing the 
practice of reimbursing the premiums to retirees 65 years of age or older. 
During the hearing, numerous Association witnesses testified that during their 
tenure as District employees they learned of the premium reimbursement practice prior 
to 2003 from current and former unit members. Theodora Bryant (Bryant), a former 
Association President from 1991-1995, testified she learned of the District's premium 
reimbursement practice in the 1980s from another unit member preparing to retire. In 
2002, Bryant retired from the District, and in May 2002 she received her first 
7
 Joint Exhibit 1, Stipulation of Facts, fl24. 
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reimbursement payment from the District. 
Barbara Slocum, the Association President when the District issued its 2003 
memorandum, testified that she first became aware of the District's practice in the late 
1990s or in 2000 during conversations with Bryant.8 Victoria Kwartller, the Association 
President at the time of the hearing, testified that she learned of the practice in the late 
1980s from Bryant and fellow unit member Roberta Furth (Furth). Similarly, Mary 
Madigan testified that she learned of the practice in the 1990s from Bryant, Furth and 
other unit members who were members of the Association's negotiation team. Jaime 
Fiore, who retired from the District in 2004, testified that she first learned of the practice 
in 1998, during a conversation with two unit members who were planning to retire. 
Betty Cheesemen also testified that she learned of the practice from a former unit 
member, Muriel Rossi, who retired in 1999.9 
The District called two witnesses, Janice Darling (Darling) and Kathy Blackman 
(Blackman), who conduct informal pre-retirement interviews on behalf of the District with 
unit members who are considering retirement. According to their testimony, no unit 
member has ever indicated to them an awareness of the District's practice of 
reimbursing the cost of Medicare Part B premiums. 
DISCUSSION 
The District challenges the Assistant Director's conclusion that the Association 
8
 Transcript, pp. 31-32. During her testimony, Slocum stated she was unsure of the 
exact year she learned of the practice from Bryant. 
9
 Many other Association witnesses testified to having knowledge of the practice while 
unit members prior to 2003, and explained how they learned of the practice. These 
witnesses include John Connors, John Ferranti, Shelley Deuel, and Patricia Swartout. 
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and unit employees had knowledge of the practice at the time that the District 
announced the discontinuance of the practice. The District asserts that the ALJ erred in 
crediting the testimony of Association witnesses on grounds that the testimony is 
unreliable because it is premised upon hearsay, unsupported by documentation, and 
contains discrepancies. In addition, the District contends that the Association was 
obligated to call additional witnesses to corroborate the hearsay testimony of the 
Association witnesses.10 
Contrary to the District's argument, most of the testimony by Association 
witnesses does not constitute hearsay because it relates to their awareness of the 
practice, rather than the truth of the matter asserted.11 Furthermore, to the extent that 
the testimony might constitute hearsay, pursuant to §212.4(e) of our Rules of Procedure 
(Rules), compliance with the technical rules of evidence are not required except as 
those rules apply to evidentiary privileges. In any event, hearsay is admissible during 
our administrative hearings and, under appropriate circumstances, it can form the sole 
basis for our decision as long as it is sufficiently relevant and probative to constitute 
substantial evidence.12 
10
 The District also challenges the respective testimony of former Superintendent of 
Schools R. David Andrus and former unit employee Jeannine Andrus. The Assistant 
Director explicitly ruled that the testimony by those witnesses is irrelevant, and neither 
party has excepted to that ruling. Supra, note 1, 42 PERB 1J4527 at 4599, n. 12. 
Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to reach the merits of the District's claim with respect 
to the testimony of those witnesses. 
11
 See, Bergstein v Bd of Ed Union Free Sch Dist No. 1 of Town of Ossining, 34 NY2d 
318(1974). 
12
 Wappingers Cent Sch Dist, 18 PERB TJ3039 (1985). See also, GrayvAdduci, 73 
NY2d 741 (1988); People ex rel Vega v Smith, 66 NY2d 130 (1985). 
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During the hearing before the Assistant Director, the Association presented a 
dozen former unit employees, including many former Association representatives, who 
testified that while employed by the District prior to 2003, they learned of the at-issue 
practice. Some witnesses testified that they learned of the practice from other current 
unit members, and others testified that they learned of the practice from former unit 
employees who were receiving reimbursement checks from the District. 
Following our examination of the record, including the testimony of District 
witnesses Darling and Blackman, we conclude that the supplemental evidence 
presented by the Association's witnesses is sufficient to resolve the ambiguity we found 
in the wording of the parties' stipulation of facts. The evidence presented at the hearing 
demonstrates that both the Association and unit employees had sufficient knowledge of ^ 
the District's practice at the time of the announced discontinuation of that practice to 
demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the practice would continue. 
In reaching our conclusion, we reject the District's contention that the testimony 
is not reliable or probative because the Association failed to present corroborating 
documentation or testimony. In general, such corroboration is unnecessary and, in the 
present case, we find no basis for requiring it. The minor discrepancies in the testimony 
cited by the District, and the length of time that the witnesses have been aware of the 
practice, do not demonstrate that the testimony of Association witnesses is not reliable. 
We now turn to the District's remaining exceptions, which repeat certain 
exceptions denied in our prior decision. Based upon the law of the case doctrine, it is 
unnecessary for us to reconsider or readdress our prior findings that the District had 
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knowledge of the past practice, the prior arbitration award is nonbinding, the subject 
matter of the charge is a term and condition of employment and is mandatorily 
negotiable, the continuation of the practice is not an unconstitutional gift of public 
funds13 and that the charge is moot based upon the 2004-2007 agreement between the 
parties.u 
Finally, it unnecessary for us to readdress the District's exceptions asserting that 
the Association lacks a contractual right to continued premium reimbursements because 
the basis for the charge is not an alleged contract violation but rather a unilateral 
change to an enforceable past practice in violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act.15 
Based on the foregoing, the District's exceptions denied and the decision 
of the Assistant Director is affirmed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District: 
1. rescind the June 12, 2003 announcement discontinuing 
reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums to current 
employees aged 65 or more once they are retired; 
13
 We note that in FIT, 41- PERB 1J3010 (2008), confirmed, FIT v New York State Pub 
Empl Rel Bd, 68 AD3d 605, 42 PERB 1J7011 (1st Dept 2009), the Appellate Division, 
First Department affirmed our decision concluding that that a legal obligation for a public 
employer to make payments based upon the continuation of a past practice under the 
Act does not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds. 
14
 The present charge was originally filed on September 12, 2003, and the 2004-2007 
agreement was signed on January 19, 2005. Joint Exhibit 1, Stipulation of Facts, 1J13 
and Exhibit A, p. 36. The agreement does not contain a clear and unmistakable 
abandonment of the Association's claim under the Act. See, CSEA v Newman, 88 
AD2d 685, 15 PERB1J7011 (1982), affd, 61 NY2d 1001, 17 PERB fl7008 (1984). 
15
 Indeed, §205.5(d) of the Act deprives the Board of the authority to enforce the terms 
of an unexpired agreement. 
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2. sign and post the attached Notice at all locations normally 
used to post communication to unit employees. 
DATED: April 22, 2010 
Albany, New York 
-10-
Robert S. Hite, Member 
/ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the bargaining unit represented by the 
Chenango Forks Teachers Association, NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO, Local 2561 that the 
Chenango Forks Central School District will: 
rescind the June 12, 2003 announcement discontinuing 
reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums to current 
employees aged 65 or more once they are retired. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Chenango Forks Central School District 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, LIVINGSTON 
COUNTY LOCAL 826, LIVINGSTON COUNTY 
EMPLOYEES UNIT 7300, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-28627 
COUNTY OF LIVINGSTON, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (CONSTANCE R. BROWN 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
DAVID W. LIPPITT, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local" 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Livingston County Local 826, 
Livingston County Employees Unit 7300 (CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissing, as untimely, an improper practice charge alleging that the 
County of Livingston (County) violated §209-a. 1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when the County unilaterally changed a past practice by requiring 
unit employees in the title of Social Work Assistant to work on certain holidays. The 
charge also alleges that the County violated the Act by failing to negotiate the impact of 
that change with CSEA. 
CSEA filed its charge on September 22, 2008. The County's affirmative 
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defenses include allegations that the charge is untimely pursuant to §204.1(a) of the 
Rules of Procedure (Rules), and that CSEA never requested impact negotiations. In 
support of its affirmative defenses, the County attached five exhibits to its answer. 
During the processing of the charge, the ALJ directed CSEA to file an offer of 
proof with respect to the County's timeliness defense. In its offer of proof, CSEA 
asserted that the charge is timely because the County implemented the change on May 
26, 2008 when Social Work Assistant Erin Randall (Randall) was required to work the 
Memorial Day holiday. In its offer, CSEA did not contest the accuracy of the exhibits 
attached to the County's answer. 
In its response to the offer, the County contended that it implemented the change 
on May 12, 2008 when a memorandum from the County's Director of Social 
Worker Services Kandie Parker (Parker) was sent to the Social Work Assistants 
assigning them by name to work particular holidays beginning with Memorial Day on 
May 26, 2008. 
Following a review of the pleadings, the offer of proof and response, and the 
exhibits attached to the answer, the ALJ issued her decision dismissing the charge 
concluding that the County implemented the change on May 12, 2008.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, CSEA asserts that the ALJ erred in dismissing the charge 
because the County implemented the at-issue change on May 26, 2008, less than four 
months before the charge was filed. In addition, CSEA contends that in dismissing the 
1
 42 PERB H4548 (2009). 
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charge the ALJ failed to address CSEA's claim that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of 
the Act by failing to negotiate the impact of the change. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the respective 
arguments of the parties, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
In describing the relevant facts, we assume the truth of the allegations in the 
charge, as clarified by CSEA in its offer of proof, granting all reasonable inferences to 
the facts alleged in support of the charge.2 
On May 7, 2008, the County's Director of Long Term Care Franklin Bassett 
(Bassett) sent a letter to CSEA Unit President Robert Ellis (Ellis) stating: 
This letter serves as notice that the Center for Nursing and 
Rehabilitation intends to proceed with plans to schedule 
Social Work Assistants and Telephone Operators to work on 
holidays as deemed necessary to meet the operational 
needs of the nursing home. There is no provision of the 
CBA that prohibits scheduling employees in this fashion. If 
you still wish to meet to discuss impacts not already 
addressed through the CBA, I am willing to do so.3 
On May 12, 2008, Director of Social Worker Services Parker issued her 
memorandum to all social work staff stating that Social Work Assistants, when 
necessary, will work five specific holidays each year on a rotating basis. The 
memorandum set forth the work schedule for the Social Work Assistants for the 
remaining holidays in 2008: 
2
 See, Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc., 42 PERB P023 (2009); Bd ofEduc 
of the City Sen Dist of the City of New York (Grassel), 43 PERB 1J3010 (2010). 
3
 ALJ Exhibit 2, Verified Answer, Exhibit B. 
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SOCIAL WORK HOLIDAY SCHEDULE 2008 
MEMORIAL DAY MAY 26, 2008 ERIN RANDALL 
COLUMBUS DAY OCTOBER 13, 2008 ANNE CAMPFIELD 
VETERAN'S DAY NOVEMBER 11, 2008 BRIGID COTTON4 
After Director of Long Term Care Bassett received a voice message from CSEA 
Unit President Ellis objecting to the change on May 12, 2008, Bassett sent Ellis a letter 
stating that the parties' collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) did not prohibit 
holiday scheduling of unit employees. In addition, Bassett stated that if Ellis identified a 
negotiated provision that prohibits such scheduling or a source of law that renders the 
County's actions to be an improper practice, the County will "immediately review it to 
determine whether our plan to schedule these employees to work holidays should be 
modified."5 
On May 21, 2008, Ellis responded with a letter to Bassett stating that the holiday 
schedule violates the agreement and that if a unit member is required to work on 
Memorial Day, CSEA would consider filing a grievance. At the conclusion of his letter, 
Ellis stated: 
Previously we had a date set to negotiate this issue. 
However, when you declined to allow representatives of the 
affected employees (one telephone operator and one social 
worker) to attend the meeting we were forced to reschedule. 
CSEA remains willing to negotiate this matter through Labor 
Management meetings. I again request that one telephone 
operator and one social worker be scheduled to attend the 
4
 ALJ Exhibit 2, Verified Answer, Exhibit A. 
5
 ALJ Exhibit 2, Verified Answer, Exhibit C. 
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meeting.6 
CSEA's charge alleges that on May 26, 2008, Social Work Assistant Randall was 
directed to work the Memorial Day holiday, and that the other Social Work Assistants were 
advised that they would be assigned by rotation to work the remaining 2008 holidays. In 
addition, the charge alleges that the County "implemented this change without negotiating 
the impact of the change in terms and conditions of employment with CSEA."7 
DISCUSSION 
An improper practice charge alleging a unilateral change in a policy or practice in 
violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act can be filed either within four months of notification of 
the change or within four months of implementation of the change.8 However, this rule 
does not eliminate the possibility of a simultaneous notification and implementation of a 
unilateral change. 
In the present case, CSEA contends that the change was not implemented until 
May 26, 2008 when Randall worked the Memorial Day holiday. In its brief, CSEA 
asserts that the County's May 12, 2008 written communications lacked sufficient 
"formality and definitiveness" to constitute an implementation of the unilateral change. 
Contrary to CSEA's argument, nothing in the Act mandates a particular formalism 
in the manner that an employer announces and/or implements a unilateral change in a 
mandatory subject of negotiations. Furthermore, the County's May 12, 2008 
6
 ALJ Exhibit 2, Verified Answer, Exhibit D. 
7
 ALJ Exhibit 1, Details of Charge, 1J9. 
8
 See, Middle Country Teachers Assoc, 21 PERB 1J3012 (1988); City of Oswego, 23 
PERB H3007(1990). 
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memorandum and letter cannot reasonably be construed as indefinite. The 
memorandum announced and implemented the new holiday work schedule. It explicitly 
identified Randall as the unit employee who would be required to work on Memorial Day 
and the other unit employees who would be required to work on the two remaining 
holidays. The letter sent by Bassett to Ellis on the same day as the memorandum, 
offering to review CSEA's contractual or legal argument, did not state or reasonably 
suggest that the County's decision to implement the new holiday schedule was nonfinal, 
subject to revocation or that it was rescinded.9 The fact that the County expressed a 
willingness to exchange information or engage in discussions with CSEA did not toll the 
four month filing period under §204.1(a)(1) of the Rules.10 
Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's decision dismissing the charge as untimely to the 
extent that it alleges that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it implemented 
the change in the work schedule. 
We next turn to CSEA's exception challenging the ALJ's dismissal of its 
allegation that the County failed to negotiate the impact of its decision in violation of 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act. In requesting CSEA to make an offer of proof, the ALJ did not 
direct it to respond to the County's affirmative defense that alleges CSEA did not make 
a request for impact negotiations. In addition, the ALJ's decision did not expressly 
address the impact negotiations allegation in the charge. 
Granting all reasonable inferences to CSEA, as we must, Bassett's May 7, 2008 
9
 See, City ofElmira, 41 PERB 1J3018 (2008). 
10
 New York State ThruwayAuth, 40 PERB 1J3014 (2007). 
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letter and Ellis's May 21, 2008 letter suggest that CSEA requested impact negotiations, 
and that at least one negotiation session was cancelled due to the refusal of the County 
to permit unit members to attend the session. In addition, the record is unclear with 
respect to the date of the County's last alleged refusal to negotiate the impact of its 
decision, which is necessary in order to determine whether that aspect of the charge is 
timely.11 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ, in part, and remand the case for 
further processing of that portion of the charge that alleges a failure to negotiate impact. 
IT I.S, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that this case is hereby remanded to the ALJ. 
DATED: April 22, 2010 
Albany, New York 
X/^tr>h^r. 
Jerome Lefkowltz, Chairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
•^ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
11
 See, Inc. VilofLake Success, 28 PERB P073 (1995); Vil of Malone, 8 PERB 
P045 (1975). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to the Board with respect to two improper practice charges 
filed by Michael A. Davitt (Davitt). In Case No. U-28642, Davitt seeks leave to file 
exceptions, pursuant to §212.4(h) of the Rules of Procedure (Rules), to rulings by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denying his applications for the issuance of agency 
subpoenas and denying his motion for disqualification based upon the ALJ's purported 
lack of impartiality. 
In his second charge, Case No. U-29420, Davitt has filed exceptions to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing the charge, as amended.1 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Oh October 2, 2008, Davitt filed Case No. U-28642 alleging, inter alia, that CSEA 
violated §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Public Employees Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it failed to represent him in a Civ Serv Law §72 hearing. Prior to the scheduled 
improper practice hearing on June 10, 2009, Davitt filed pre-hearing applications with 
the ALJ seeking issuance of numerous subpoenas ad testificandum and subpoenas 
duces tecum for the production of telephone logs, e-mails, memoranda and other 
documents.2 CSEA and the County of Rockland (County) objected to the issuance of 
the subpoenas requested by Davitt.3 Without seeking leave from the ALJ, Davitt 
submitted written responses to the objections filed by CSEA and the County.4 
1
 42 PERB U4584 (2009). 
2
 ALJ Exhibits 8 and 16. 
3
 ALJ Exhibits 11 and 13. 
4
 ALJ Exhibits 12 and 14. 
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On April 24, 2009, the ALJ issued a letter decision denying Davitt's applications for 
the issuance of the subpoenas.5 The ALJ ruled that the documents and witnesses sought 
from the County were irrelevant to the issue of whether CSEA violated §§209-a.2(a) and 
(c) of the Act. The ALJ also found that Davitt's request for the issuance of a subpoena for 
the production of documents from CSEA was deficient because it failed to specifically 
identify the documents sought and the relevancy of those documents as required by 
§211.3(c) of the Rules. Finally, the ALJ concluded that issuance of the witness 
subpoenas were unnecessary because CSEA's counsel, in opposition to the application, 
had made a representation that the individuals sought would be in attendance at the 
hearing, and available to testify. 
By letter dated May 9, 2009, Davitt sought to reargue the denial of his 
applications for the issuance of subpoenas, which the ALJ denied, by a letter decision 
on May 22, 2009.6 At the commencement of the hearing on June 10, 2009, Davitt 
moved to disqualify the ALJ based upon her denial of his subpoena requests.7 The ALJ 
denied the motion for disqualification and the hearing proceeded.8 
On or about August 27, 2009, Davitt filed Case No. U-29420 alleging that CSEA 
violated §§209-a.1(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g), and §§209-a.2(a), (b) and (c) of the 
Act. Following his initial review, pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules, the Director notified 
Davitt of various deficiencies in the charge: the illegibility of portions of his handwritten 
details of charge; his failure to set forth a clear and concise statement of the facts as 
5
 ALJ Exhibit 17. 
6
 ALJ Exhibits 18 and 19. 
7
 Transcript, pp. 20, 22-23. 
8
 A second day of hearing was held on October 28, 2009. 
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required by §204.1(b)(3) of the Rules; his lack of standing to allege violations of §§209-
a.1(d) and (e) and §209-a.2(b) of the Act; his failure to name the County as a 
respondent; his allegation that CSEA, as an employee organization, violated §209-a.1 
of the Act; and his failure to allege sufficient facts to state a claim against CSEA for 
violating §209-a.2 of the Act. 
On September 12, 2009, Davitt filed an amended charge with the same 
handwritten details of charge and attached exhibits. The amended charge names the 
County as a respondent and alleges that the County violated §§209-a.1 (a), (b), (c), (f) 
and (g) of the Act. In addition, the amended charge alleges CSEA violated §§209-
a.2(a) and (c) of the Act. Following his review of the amended pleading, the Director 
concluded that it failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim against the County 
and/or CSEA under the Act, and therefore, he issued a decision dismissing the 
amended charge. 
In his exceptions to the Director's decision, Davitt makes conclusory allegations 
that the dismissal of his amended charge is based on bias, that it constitutes a 
miscarriage of justice and is contrary to a probable cause finding made by the New York 
State Division of Human Rights that the County has engaged in or is engaging in an 
unlawful discriminatory practice in violation of the New York's Human Rights Law.9 
CSEA and the County oppose Davitt's motion for leave to file exceptions in Case 
No. U-28642 and support the Director's decision dismissing Case No. U-29420.10 
9
 Executive Law §296. 
10
 After Davitt filed a supplemental pleading entitled "Plaintiff's Response to 
Respondents CSEA Brief in Response to Denial of Exceptions," he was advised that 
the Board would not consider it because such a pleading is not permitted under §213.3 
of the Rules unless authorized by the Board. 
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DISCUSSION 
We begin with Davitt's motion for leave to file exceptions in Case No. U-28642 to 
the ALJ's denials of his applications for the issuance of agency subpoenas pursuant to 
§211 of the Rules and to the denial of his motion for the disqualification of the ALJ. 
Leave to file interlocutory exceptions to non-final rulings and decisions, pursuant 
to §212.4(h) of the Rules, will be granted only when a moving party demonstrates 
extraordinary circumstances.11 This high standard is predicated on "our recognition that 
it is more efficient to await a final disposition of the merits of a charge before we 
examine interim determinations. The improvident grant of leave can result in 
unnecessary delays in the processing of improper practice charges."12 
Pursuant to §211.1 of the Rules, an ALJ has the discretion to grant or deny a 
request for the issuance of subpoenas. The mere denial of such a request, without any 
additional relevant allegations, does not constitute extraordinary circumstances 
warranting the grant of leave to file exceptions.13 In support of his motion, Davitt has 
not articulated any facts or circumstances to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances 
that warrant interlocutory review of the ALJ's denial of his requests for subpoenas. 
Therefore, we deny his motion for leave to file exceptions to the ALJ's rulings denying 
his applications for subpoenas. 
Similarly, we deny Davitt's motion for leave to file exceptions to the ALJ's denial 
of his motion for disqualification. We will grant a party leave to file exceptions from the 
11
 State of New York (Division of Parole), 40 PERB U3007 (2007); UFT (Grassel), 32 
PERB 1J3071 (1999). 
12
 Board ofEduc of the City School District of the City of New York (Grassel), 41 PERB 
H3031 at 3135 (2008). 
^Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth, 41 PERB 1(3021 (2008). 
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denial of such a motion only when the alleged facts and circumstances demonstrate 
that the ALJ has a personal bias or is otherwise incapable of processing the charge in 
an impartial manner.14 Unless such extraordinary circumstances are demonstrated, 
allegations that an ALJ's conduct creates a reasonable appearance or perception of 
favoritism toward a particular party are best examined in the context of a full record 
following the ALJ's merits decision and proposed order. 
As we emphasized in Board of Education of the City School District of the City of 
New York (Grassel): 
objections to procedural and evidentiary rulings will rarely, if 
ever, constitute legitimate grounds for recusal or constitute 
extraordinary circumstances warranting the grant of leave for 
interlocutory review of an ALJ's denial of a party's motion 
seeking such relief.15 
In the present case, Davitt's motion is predicated upon the ALJ's denials of his 
requests for subpoenas, along with conclusory assertions that the ALJ is not impartial. 
Based upon our review of the record, we find no evidence demonstrating bias by the . 
ALJ or any other facts and circumstances to establish extraordinary circumstances 
warranting the grant of Davitt's motion for leave to file exceptions to review the issue of 
disqualification at this time. 
Next, we examine Davitt's exceptions in Case No. U-29420 to the Director's decision 
dismissing his second charge, as amended. Pursuant to §213.2(b)(2) of the Rules, a party 
filing exceptions from a decision is obligated to identify the parts of a decision he or she 
wishes to have reviewed. In his exceptions, Davitt does not identify any specific part of the 
14
 State of New York (Bruns), 25 PERB H3007 (1992); Town of Penfield, 29 PERB 
P028 (1996); Bd of Educ of the City School District of the City of New York (Grassel), 
supra note 12. 
15
 Supra note 12. 
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Director's decision that he wishes to have reviewed nor does he set forth a clear statement 
of alleged material facts that support the merits of his amended charge. 
Based upon our review of the record, and after granting all reasonable inferences to 
the facts that can be discerned from Davitt's handwritten details of charge, we affirm the 
Director's conclusion that Davitt has failed to allege sufficient material facts to support his 
claim that the County and/or CSEA violated the Act. Although the probable cause finding 
by the New York State Division of Human Rights has clear relevancy to Davitt's charge of 
employment discrimination under the Executive Law, under the facts and circumstances of 
the present case, it is insufficient to support his separate claims that the County and CSEA 
violated their respective obligations under the Act. Finally, we find no support in the record 
for Davitt's allegation that the dismissal of his amended charge was based upon bias or 
partiality by the Director. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny Davitt's motion for leave to file 
exceptions in Case No. U-28642, and we deny his exceptions and affirm the decision of 
the Director in Case No. U-29420. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that Case No. U-29420 must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.16 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: April 22, 2010 
Albany, New York 
jrome Lefkowifz, Chaifman 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
16
 Board Member Robert S. Hite took no part. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 23, 2009, the United Public Service Employees Union (petitioner) 
filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations 
Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain 
employees of the Berlin Central School District (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
Case No. C-5929 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All non-instructional personnel. 
Excluded: District Clerk, Business Administrator, Superintendent of 
Buildings, Director of Transportation, Secretary to the 
Superintendent of Schools, Senior Account Clerk, Treasurer, 
Assistant Treasurer, Payroll Clerk, Tax Collector, Signing 
Interpreter, substitute employees, temporary employees and 
employees working less than four (4) hours per day. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on March 15, 
2010, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: April 22, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
FILLMORE ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5901 
FILLMORE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
FILLMORE FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Fillmore Adminstrators Association has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, as their exclusive 
Certification - C-5901 page 2 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Principal, Curriculum Director and School Guidance Counselor. 
Excluded: All other titles. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Fillmore Administrators Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 22, 2010 
. Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
'CLL—J-C 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 693, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5920 
VILLAGE OF SIDNEY, 
Employer, 
-and-
NYS FEDERATION OF POLICE, 
Intervenor/lncumbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a • 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 693 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
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representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of -
grievances. 
Included: All regular full-time Police Officers. 
Excluded: All part-time Special Police, Dispatchers, Jailer, Dog Control Officer 
and Department Head and/or Chief of Police and/or Commissioner 
of Police. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 693. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: April 22, 2010 
Albany, New York . 
/I Jerome Lefkowitz, CKalrman 
' Robert S.'Hite, Member 
/^ Sheila S. Cole, Member 
